Bank of England Minutes v The Bank of England Plenderlieth Report

Just a very quick blog – mostly a copy paste job because I am very confused by the Bank of England Minutes 07-09 which were published today. I have to admit I have not read the entire document but, as of September 2007 I am surprised the minutes did not contain masses of detail and concern about HBOS (Fox) or Lloyds (Lark).

Here’s why:

In October 2012 the Bank of England presented the Plenderleith Report to the Court. I went through this report with a fine tooth comb because of some work I was doing with Paul Moore. And I came to the conclusion that, even although it did little good to the economy, the Bank of England, albeit frustrated by a lack of data from the FSA, was closely monitoring HBOS by September 2007.

I have very quickly I have taken out the salient points which highlight this position:

Executive Summary
8.
In relation to the specific vulnerabilities of the two banks to which the Bank eventually
extended ELA, the Bank was able to identify in advance, and to monitor, the increasing
liquidity strains thatHBOS was experiencing during 2008. There was significantly less close
focus on the liquidity position of RBS, but its funding problems did not in fact crystallise untila late stage, after the failure of Lehman Brothers.
9.
In relation to both banks, however,and indeed to the process of monitoring the risks to
individual banks in general, the Bank’s ability to identify impending threats in concrete terms was made more difficult by an underlap that had developed in the regulatory structure.Initially at any rate, the Bank was dependant on the FSA for liquidity data on individual banks; but the data available to the FSA were not forward looking and
lacked the granular detail the Bank required for an operational response like ELA. Equally, while the Bank could identify the threat that vulnerabilities in individual banks posed to wider systemic stability, the FSA was less closely focused on the deteriorating systemic picture. Under the pressure of events, this underlap was progressively bridged during the course of 2008, but it hampered how far in advance the Bank could get a clear view of the strains building up on individual banks.
10.
Since the funding difficulties being experienced by HBOS were identified at an early stage,
well in advance of its need for ELA crystallising in October 2008, the Review suggests that,
where there is advance awareness of such strains, the Bank might consider acting pre
emptively to provide bilateral liquidity support before the need becomes immediate.

 

And here is the main chapter on HBOS:

How aware was the Bank of the particular vulnerabilities of the two banks to which

it eventually extended ELA?
The case of HBOS
98.
As noted above, the run on Northern Rock marked a step-change in the level of the Bank’s
engagement with individual banks and it is clear that the Bank, and indeed the other
members of the Tripartite, were fully aware of the vulnerabilities of HBOS prior to its need
for ELA in October 2008. By September 2007 the Bank was receiving what it felt were more
appropriate data from the FSA, at any rate on banks identified as more vulnerable, including
daily liquidity reports from the FSA on HBOS (as well as on Alliance & Leicester and Bradford
& Bingley).
99.
Work undertaken within the Bank in November 2007 identified a number of key risks that
meant that HBOS was likely to be particularly vulnerable to a change in market sentiment.
These included: the risk of reputational contagion from association with other mortgage
banks, given that HBOS was the UK’s largest mortgage bank; HBOS’s reliance on wholesale
funding at around 50% oftotal funding, and within that its reliance on securitisation as a
source of funding; and its commercial property exposures. At that stage, HBOS was
nonetheless viewed as being somewhat less vulnerable than Alliance & Leicester and
Bradford & Bingley because of its more diversified business model.
100.
The increased focus on individual banks and improved data flow from the FSA was not just
confined to HBOS, Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley. From September 2007, the
Bank began to receive liquidity information on other major UK banks from the FSA at least
weekly. The individual banks’ data lacked in several respects the detail the Bank would have
liked, but it was used by the Bank to try to determine which banks would be most affected by
a crystallisation of the possible key risks to the UK banking sector. Iterations of this work
were shared with the Tripartite Standing Committee in October and November 2007.
101.
From late 2007, the Tripartite authorities began contingency planning to map out possible
options for resolving HBOS should the key risks facing it crystallise. There was heightened
monitoring of HBOS from March 2008 after the emergency sale of Bear Stearns on 16 March
and after an unfounded market rumour that HBOS was receiving emergency assistance
from the Bank caused a sharp fall in HBOS’s share price on 19 March. At this stage the Bank was considering in detail the consequences of HBOS, like Northern Rock the previous September,being unable to fund itself in the markets.
102.
By mid-April 2008, although still work in progress, a comprehensive contingency plan had
been prepared by the FSA, in conjunction with HMT and the Bank. This contingency planning
explicitly recognised the possibility of the Bank needing to undertake some form of ELA in
the event of wholesale markets beginning to close to HBOS. Although by May the immediate

threat to HBOS appeared to have receded somewhat, in part because it was able to
utilisethe SLS launched in April, the Bank continued through the summer closely to monitor HBOS’s liquidity strains on a daily basis as HBOS endeavouredto scale back assets and increase deposits in order to reduce its reliance on wholesale funding. In the event, wholesale funding became increasingly difficult as the maturity of funding available to
HBOS shortened progressively increasing the ‘snowball’of funding that had to be rolled at shorter maturities
With the failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 September, HBOS’s position rapidly became
untenable. When it finally needed to seek ELA from the Bank on 1 October, the approach did
not come as a surprise and the Bank was able to respond rapidly.
The full report is here

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/cr1plenderleith.pdf

This report suggests the BoE and the Tripartauthority were fully or at least partially prepared for the Crisis. I could be wrong but the reports on the minutes seem to infer this wasn’t the case.

 

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