Monthly Archives: January 2015

If you don’t identify the crimes or the criminals, you don’t have to support the victims.

There was an interesting article in the Guardian today on the subject of Lady Newlove’s report into the lack of support for victims of crime. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/27/victims-crime-let-down-criminal-justice-newlove I agree with her entirely – there is very little support. Equally interesting was the comments below the article.

For example, someone posted we are all more likely to be victims of financial crime than being mugged in the street. I would agree because PPI, IRHP, LIBOR rigging, asset theft (GRG) and various other fraudulent schemes, all have their victims – not that I am in anyway decrying the horrific consequences of violent crime.

However, there is a huge problem when it comes to financial crime. First and foremost, it is rarely classified as crime. It has various bogus titles and the most common is mis-selling. Also, financial crime is a political animal and as such, it seems to feel it is reasonable it should fall outside of the boundaries of common law. It shouldn’t do but it does. This is probably because any major case exposing the horrendous corruption in our financial system would have far reaching political and economic consequences. Not only would it risk serious ‘Brand protection’ to financial institutions, it would also damage UKPLC. Therefore even if you report serious and fully substantiated financial fraud to the police, you are unlikely to get an investigation – so you are unlikely to get a result.

Anyone challenging this view should consider why, when Banks are found guilty of money laundering for drug cartels, or of rigging LIBOR (which affects everyone), or of selling fraudulent products to consumers and SMEs, the answer is invariably a huge fine paid by the Bank shareholders? But no one goes to jail.

Occasionally and if you are incredibly persistent, the police will open an investigation into specific crimes by bankers or their associates in the financial system and, I can say from experience, that despite the initial euphoria victims may feel when this happens, what follows is a long drawn out process which gives little or no consideration to victims or to the consequences of those crimes. And while I adhere to the theory of “every man is innocent until proven guilty,” a justice system which takes years and years to bring cases to trial means that some victims, suffering badly from the effects of a crime, will have their lives on hold for an indefinite period. Some die before they ever see justice and that is a fact. “Justice delayed is justice denied.”(See below)

Take for example the case (which I won’t name for reasons of sub judice) where some 80 SMEs were first defrauded and then destroyed by employees and associates of a High Street bank. This was first exposed by the victims in 2007 but the police refused to investigate because the bank concerned assured them there was nothing to investigate. However, in 2010 and under the radar, a different police force did start an investigation. By the end of 2010 several people had been arrested but no one was charged until 2013. The trials for those people charged with assorted serious crimes were due to start in January this year but have now been put back to September and will finish in 2016 – if they happen at all. 2007 to 2016 is a long time to wait for justice. Three people have died while waiting.

The victims have lost their businesses, therefore their livelihoods and in many cases their family homes. They are all due compensation – but that won’t happen until after the trials as the management of the bank concerned are adamant no crime was committed (even although the Bank was the biggest loser of all) and the police have spent a fortune of public money on a witch hunt.

In the meantime there is little communication between the police and the victims except for the odd brief e-mail. The victims are dissuaded and even threatened not to attend any case management hearings – so they don’t know how the case is progressing (or not in this case) and if ‘victim support’ are aware of this crime, they haven’t acknowledged it. I know most of the victims – I don’t know any who have had any support.

The defendants on the other hand, are kept fully briefed by their legal teams (some of whom are paid for by legal aid), they continue to work or trade their businesses (which haven’t been destroyed) and some have requested and been given their passports back as and when they want to go on holiday abroad. Fair enough, they have not been found guilty as yet.

My point – most people in this Country are asking (quite reasonably) why bankers, who have already been found guilty of various crimes for which their shareholders have been penalised, have not been charged or gone to jail? I would say it is because the majority of the really serious crimes had to have happened with at least the knowledge and possibly the authorisation of those at the top of the Banks – not to mention key figures in associated ‘professional’ firms. But if Governments (via the justice system) start admitting our banks have been and are being run by criminals, it would destabilise our much loved financial system. So, even where a case does slip through the radar and bankers are charged with crimes, the main consideration seems to be how the authorities can limit contagion and, if possible, stop these trials actually going to Court. A valiant attempt was made to stop Operation Cotton and therefore other big financial fraud and VHCC (very high cost cases) from proceeding, via the legal aid débâcle. Fortunately it wasn’t successful.

And the victims? Well, better a few victims fall by the wayside than we tarnish the City of London. But actually it’s not a ‘few victims’ because we are all victims of financial crime and we are all paying the price (national austerity) while the charade goes on. And what a charade it is – after all that has happened and after banks brought world economies to their knees, top bankers demand and still get millions of pounds a year. And once a year they head off to Davos with the great and the good, to decide our economic future for the following 12 months. It’s not just illogical and unethical – it’s bonkers.

Great to see Lady Newlove has written a report and identified the lack of support for victims but, in the case of financial crime, which has reached epidemic proportions in the UK, the biggest hurdle to our justice system is a refusal to identify the criminals. Cost effective and sneaky but not democratic.

  • On the subject of “justice delayed is justice denied” and while I was looking for the origins of that quote, I randomly came across an extraordinary dark example of how this statement is sometimes abused by the very authorities we rely on for justice. The case is nothing to do with financial crime and the victim in the case is the accused. And this highlights yet again how important it is to democracy that justice is seen to be done and in a timely manner. I would say in too many cases, it isn’t. http://www.innocent.org.uk/cases/Karl%20Watson%20-%20Woffinden%20art.pdf

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Bank of England Minutes v The Bank of England Plenderlieth Report

Just a very quick blog – mostly a copy paste job because I am very confused by the Bank of England Minutes 07-09 which were published today. I have to admit I have not read the entire document but, as of September 2007 I am surprised the minutes did not contain masses of detail and concern about HBOS (Fox) or Lloyds (Lark).

Here’s why:

In October 2012 the Bank of England presented the Plenderleith Report to the Court. I went through this report with a fine tooth comb because of some work I was doing with Paul Moore. And I came to the conclusion that, even although it did little good to the economy, the Bank of England, albeit frustrated by a lack of data from the FSA, was closely monitoring HBOS by September 2007.

I have very quickly I have taken out the salient points which highlight this position:

Executive Summary
8.
In relation to the specific vulnerabilities of the two banks to which the Bank eventually
extended ELA, the Bank was able to identify in advance, and to monitor, the increasing
liquidity strains thatHBOS was experiencing during 2008. There was significantly less close
focus on the liquidity position of RBS, but its funding problems did not in fact crystallise untila late stage, after the failure of Lehman Brothers.
9.
In relation to both banks, however,and indeed to the process of monitoring the risks to
individual banks in general, the Bank’s ability to identify impending threats in concrete terms was made more difficult by an underlap that had developed in the regulatory structure.Initially at any rate, the Bank was dependant on the FSA for liquidity data on individual banks; but the data available to the FSA were not forward looking and
lacked the granular detail the Bank required for an operational response like ELA. Equally, while the Bank could identify the threat that vulnerabilities in individual banks posed to wider systemic stability, the FSA was less closely focused on the deteriorating systemic picture. Under the pressure of events, this underlap was progressively bridged during the course of 2008, but it hampered how far in advance the Bank could get a clear view of the strains building up on individual banks.
10.
Since the funding difficulties being experienced by HBOS were identified at an early stage,
well in advance of its need for ELA crystallising in October 2008, the Review suggests that,
where there is advance awareness of such strains, the Bank might consider acting pre
emptively to provide bilateral liquidity support before the need becomes immediate.

 

And here is the main chapter on HBOS:

How aware was the Bank of the particular vulnerabilities of the two banks to which

it eventually extended ELA?
The case of HBOS
98.
As noted above, the run on Northern Rock marked a step-change in the level of the Bank’s
engagement with individual banks and it is clear that the Bank, and indeed the other
members of the Tripartite, were fully aware of the vulnerabilities of HBOS prior to its need
for ELA in October 2008. By September 2007 the Bank was receiving what it felt were more
appropriate data from the FSA, at any rate on banks identified as more vulnerable, including
daily liquidity reports from the FSA on HBOS (as well as on Alliance & Leicester and Bradford
& Bingley).
99.
Work undertaken within the Bank in November 2007 identified a number of key risks that
meant that HBOS was likely to be particularly vulnerable to a change in market sentiment.
These included: the risk of reputational contagion from association with other mortgage
banks, given that HBOS was the UK’s largest mortgage bank; HBOS’s reliance on wholesale
funding at around 50% oftotal funding, and within that its reliance on securitisation as a
source of funding; and its commercial property exposures. At that stage, HBOS was
nonetheless viewed as being somewhat less vulnerable than Alliance & Leicester and
Bradford & Bingley because of its more diversified business model.
100.
The increased focus on individual banks and improved data flow from the FSA was not just
confined to HBOS, Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley. From September 2007, the
Bank began to receive liquidity information on other major UK banks from the FSA at least
weekly. The individual banks’ data lacked in several respects the detail the Bank would have
liked, but it was used by the Bank to try to determine which banks would be most affected by
a crystallisation of the possible key risks to the UK banking sector. Iterations of this work
were shared with the Tripartite Standing Committee in October and November 2007.
101.
From late 2007, the Tripartite authorities began contingency planning to map out possible
options for resolving HBOS should the key risks facing it crystallise. There was heightened
monitoring of HBOS from March 2008 after the emergency sale of Bear Stearns on 16 March
and after an unfounded market rumour that HBOS was receiving emergency assistance
from the Bank caused a sharp fall in HBOS’s share price on 19 March. At this stage the Bank was considering in detail the consequences of HBOS, like Northern Rock the previous September,being unable to fund itself in the markets.
102.
By mid-April 2008, although still work in progress, a comprehensive contingency plan had
been prepared by the FSA, in conjunction with HMT and the Bank. This contingency planning
explicitly recognised the possibility of the Bank needing to undertake some form of ELA in
the event of wholesale markets beginning to close to HBOS. Although by May the immediate

threat to HBOS appeared to have receded somewhat, in part because it was able to
utilisethe SLS launched in April, the Bank continued through the summer closely to monitor HBOS’s liquidity strains on a daily basis as HBOS endeavouredto scale back assets and increase deposits in order to reduce its reliance on wholesale funding. In the event, wholesale funding became increasingly difficult as the maturity of funding available to
HBOS shortened progressively increasing the ‘snowball’of funding that had to be rolled at shorter maturities
With the failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 September, HBOS’s position rapidly became
untenable. When it finally needed to seek ELA from the Bank on 1 October, the approach did
not come as a surprise and the Bank was able to respond rapidly.
The full report is here

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/cr1plenderleith.pdf

This report suggests the BoE and the Tripartauthority were fully or at least partially prepared for the Crisis. I could be wrong but the reports on the minutes seem to infer this wasn’t the case.